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Abstract
The government’s choices of the corporate tax rate and public investment are inter-
dependent. In particular, they both respond positively to the other. Therefore, international 
tax competition not only drives corporate tax rates to lower levels but might also affect 
negatively the stock of public capital. We build a general equilibrium model that illustrates 
the relation between the two variables. We then add an element of international tax 
competition. Our simulations show that when international tax competition drives the 
statutory tax rate down from 45% to 30%, public investment is reduced by 0.4% of output 
at the steady state. The short run effect is three times higher. The second part of our study 
displays an empirical analysis that corroborates the main outcome of the model. We 
estimate two policy functions for 21 OECD countries and find that corporate tax rate and 
public investment are endogenous. More precisely, a decline of 15% in the corporate tax 
rate reduces public investment by 0.6% to 1.1% of GDP. We also find evidence that 
international competition operates on both policy tools. 
JEL Classification: H0; H26; H54 
Keywords: Tax competition; Corporate tax; Public investment; Public capital. 5
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Non technical summary
Over the past 30 years, there has been a downward trend in two distinct government
policy tools. On the one hand, statutory corporate tax rates have gone down in the
majority of the OECD countries from around 45% to 30%, on average. On the other hand,
public investment has declined from an average of 4.5% of GDP to below 3% of GDP. As
a consequence, public capital stock has fallen by 10% of GDP.
The decline in statutory corporate tax rate is a well documented phenomenon. It is
usually attributed to international tax competition and a higher degree of capital and proﬁt
mobility. In contrast, the literature examining the downward trend in public investment is
scarcer and far less compelling.
We argue that these two phenomena are related. Firstly, we claim that there is an
intrinsic relation between corporate tax and public investment, beyond the simple identity
of the government budget constraint. On the one hand, governments spend more in public
investment, relative to government consumption if the tax rate is high. The intuition for
this is the following. The existence of public capital creates rents for the ﬁrms. Part of
these rents are appropriated by the government through the corporate taxation. In a way,
corporate taxation can be seen as a return on public investment. If a government cares
about revenue (or cares about the distortions of raising revenue) it will invest more relative
to government consumption, the higher the corporate tax rate. On the other hand, the
level of tax rate also depends positively on the level of public capital. The higher the level
of public capital, the higher the rents for the ﬁrm, and thus the higher the tax rate they
can support. Both policy variables respond positively to each other and the two are jointly
determined.
Given the endogenous relation between these two variables, we argue that the increase6
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in the international tax competition, that has been exogenously driving the corporate tax
rate down over the past years brought about, as a side eﬀect, the reduction of public
investment.
To make our case, we ﬁrst build a general equilibrium model, where government chooses
the corporate tax rate and the amount spent in accumulating public capital stock and in
government consumption. Additionally, we consider an element of tax competition to assess
the short and long run implications of a greater degree of corporate tax competition. We,
then, perform an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries for the period between 1966
and 2002.
Following a decline of 15% in tax rate (driven by an exogenous increase in tax com-
petition), public investment in steady state diminishes between 0.2% and 0.4% of output.
This leads to a drop in the steady state public capital stock over output ranging from 4 to
11 percentage points. We also perform simulation on the transition between steady states
and ﬁnd that the short run impact on public investment can be up to three times larger
than the long run eﬀect. We also create diﬀerent scenarios and challenge the robustness
of the relationship. In all cases, international tax competition reduces the share of public
spending allocated to public investment, consequently reducing the stock of public capital.
In the empirical part, we estimate two endogenous policy functions of corporate tax rate
and public investment that also respond to their foreign counterpart. Evidence conﬁrms the
endogeneity and the complementarity between the two tools: tax rate increases with the
level of public investment and public investment increases with the tax rate. We ﬁnd that
a decline in tax rate of 15%, reduces public investment by 0.6% to 1.1% of GDP. Further
evidence suggests that international competition has aﬀected both tools, particularly the
corporate tax rate.7
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1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, there has been a downward trend in two distinct government policy
tools. On the one hand, statutory corporate tax rates have gone down in the majority of
OECD countries from around 45% to 30%. On the other hand, public investment has
declined from an average of 4.5% of GDP to below 3% of GDP. As a consequence, public
capital stock has fallen by 10% of GDP (see Figure 1 below). In contrast, government
consumption has increased during this period.
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The decline in statutory corporate tax rate is a well documented phenomenon. It is
usually attributed to international tax competition and a higher degree of capital and proﬁt
mobility.1
In contrast, the literature examining the downward trend in public investment is scarcer
and far less compelling.2 In a way, the decline of public investment and public capital
1See for instance Krogstrup (2004).
2Some frequent explanations for the decline of public investment include: the increase of privatization,
the increase of private-public partnerships, the smaller role of the government or, in the case of Europe, the
need for ﬁscal stringency. Some of these explanations are not very convincing as argued by Mehrotra and
V¨ alil¨ a (2006). First, under national accounts, the investment undertaken by public enterprizes counts as
private investment. Only investment recorded and ﬁnanced from the budget counts as public investment .
Second, private and public partnership is a very recent phenomenon that could not account for the pattern
observed since the 1970s. Furthermore, government consumption has increased during the same period for
most OECD countries. Studies of the determinants of public investment include Randolph, Bogetic, and
Heﬂey (1996) and Balassone and Franco (2000).8
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stock is a puzzle. B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007), among others, show
for instance that the location of multinational ﬁrms does not entirely depend on national
tax policies but also on ‘public infrastructure’, partly because of its positive eﬀect of the
productivity of private capital. Under these circumstances, the relationship displayed in
Figure 1 could appear counter-intuitive: in a more competitive environment we would
indeed expect countries to increase their stock of public capital (at the expense of public
consumption) in order to attract more private investment.
We argue that these two phenomenons are related. Firstly, we claim that there is
an intrinsical relation between corporate tax and public investment, beyond the simple
identity of the government budget constraint. On the one hand, if the tax rate is high,
governments spend more in public investment, relative to government consumption . The
intuition for this is the following. The existence of public capital creates rents for the ﬁrms.
Part of these rents are appropriated by the government through the corporate taxation. In
a way corporate taxation can be seen as a return on public investment. If the tax rate is at
high levels, a government that cares about revenue (or cares about the distortions of raising
revenue) tends to favour public investment, at the expenses of government consumption.
On the other hand, the level of tax rate also depends positively on the level of public
capital. The higher the level of public capital, the higher the rents for the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm is, therefore, able to support a higher tax burden on its proﬁt. Both policy variables
respond positively to each other and the two are jointly determined.
Given the endogenous relation between corporate tax rate and public investment, we
argue that the increase in the international tax competition, that has been exogenously
driving the corporate tax rate down over the past years, caused, as a side eﬀect, the
reduction of public investment.9
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To make our case, we ﬁrst build a model where the decision-maker decides on a corpo-
rate tax policy, but also chooses how to allocate its public resource. In this respect, the
government has two alternatives: it can either invest (and therefore increase the stock of
public capital) or allocate its tax receipts into “unproductive” government consumption.
Additionally, we consider an element of tax competition to assess the short and long run
macroeconomic implications of a greater degree of corporate tax competition. We, then,
perform an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries for the period between 1966 and
2002.
In line with Pouget and St´ eclebout-Orseau (2008), our model attempts to illustrate
the interdependence between statutory tax rates and productive spending. We develop
our analysis in a general equilibrium setting and in this way we aim to provide a realistic
quantitative analysis. In our two-country model, governments can enlarge their tax base
by deciding on a more accommodating corporate tax rate or by increasing the stock of
productive public capital (or public infrastructures). Because the exact source of tax
competition does not aﬀect the main mechanism of the model, we focus on proﬁt shifting
as opposed to capital mobility. Due to the growing internalization of the corporate sector,
particularly in Europe, multinational companies have increased their ability to change the
location of their declared proﬁt in response to tax rates diﬀerentials for tax avoidance
purposes.3 Our simulations indicate that, following a decline of 15% in tax rate (driven by
increasing competition), public investment in steady state diminishes between 0.2% and
0.4% of output. This leads to a drop in the steady state public capital stock over output
3Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) performed an empirical analysis based on OECD countries and estimate
in their baseline scenario that 65% of the additional revenue from a unilateral tax increase is lost due to a
decrease in the reported proﬁt to the national tax authorities. See also Huizinga and Laeven (2007) who
have calculated that the average semi-elasticity of reported proﬁts with respect to the top statutory tax
rate. In particular, Germany appears to have lost considerable tax revenues due to proﬁt mobility -see
Weichenrieder (2007). For other contributions on international tax competition and proﬁt shifting, see
Kind, Midelfart, and Schjelderup (2005), and Elitzur and Mintz (1996).10
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ranging from 4 to 11 percentage points. We also perform simulation on the transition
between steady states and ﬁnd that the short run impact on public investment can be
up to three times larger than the long run eﬀect. We also create diﬀerent scenarios and
challenge the robustness of the relationship. In all cases, international tax competition
reduces the share of public spending allocated to public investment, therefore reducing the
stock of public capital.
In the empirical part we estimate two endogenous policy functions of corporate tax rate
and public investment that also respond to their foreign counterpart. Evidence conﬁrms the
endogeneity and the complementarity between the two tools: tax rate increases with the
level of public investment and public investment increases with the tax rate. We ﬁnd that
a decline in tax rate of 15%, reduces public investment by 0.6% to 1.1% of GDP. Further
evidence suggests that both tools are driven by competition, particularly te corporate tax
rate.
The next section of this paper introduces the theoretical model by presenting the main
assumptions and mechanisms in a partial equilibrium setting. In the third section we
calibrate the model and present the quantitative results. The empirical analysis is presented
in the fourth section. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
The general equilibrium model consists of two countries denoted A and B. National govern-
ments decide on a tax rate levied on the beneﬁts of the corporate sector and allocate their
tax receipts either to “productive” public investment or public consumption. The corpo-
rate sector is introduced through a single representative multinational ﬁrm producing a
homogeneous good in both countries.11
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Capital is perfectly mobile between the two countries and the ﬁrm can borrow at a
world interest rate. Since the two national tax bases are not consolidated, the corporate
sector has the ability to shift proﬁt in order to reduce its overall tax burden. However,
these operations entail some costs. We assume perfect foresight and no uncertainty.
2.1 The Households
In each country i (i ∈{ A;B}), a representative household derives its utility from both




t + ξ lngi
t + γ lnPi
t (1)
The utility derived from public spending depends ﬁrst on government consumption, gi
t,
which covers all current expenditures with no direct productive purposes. Additionally, the
household’s utility depends on the stock of public capital, denoted Pi
t. This stock represents
a wide range of public infrastructures, such as roads or bridges, that are valuated by the
representative household but also used in the production process (see below). Therefore,
in line with Keen and Marchand (1997), our model relies on a clear-cut distinction between
productive and non-productive government spending. Parameters ξ and γ tell us that the
representative household can valuate diﬀerently these two categories of public spending.
In each country, the representative household takes public variables as given and max-












t − ¯ t (2)
In each period, household’s resources are either consumed (ci
t) or saved by holding shares12
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of the private sector (Ii
t). We assume that the representative household supplies one unit
of labour inelastically and wage rate is set at wi
t. Total net resources depend also on the
total amount of private capital owned by the household, denoted Bi
t, which yields a gross
return of rk
t and whose law of motion (assume that the depreciation rate of private capital
is δ)i s :
Bi
t+1 =( 1− δ)Bi
t + Ii
t (3)
The household receives also dividends earned by the private sector: Υi
t (which will be
deﬁned later on). Besides, a lump sum tax on personal income, ¯ t, is levied in order to
ﬁnance public policy. Note that this speciﬁc tax rate will be considered exogenous in
this model. Maximizing ˆ U(ci
t) subject to (2) gives us the consumption pattern of the
representative household, which is determined by the following Euler condition (we deﬁne
rt = rk
t − δ as the net interest rate):
ci
t+1 = ci
t(1 + rt+1)β (4)
2.2 The Corporate Sector
A single multinational ﬁrm operating in the two countries represents the private sector. It










The labor input, ni
t, is considered to be immobile between the two countries. By contrast,
capital is perfectly mobile and ki
t describes the total quantity of capital used in country
i. Public capital stock is included in the production function and, therefore, increases the
marginal productivity of capital. Pi
t is considered as given by the ﬁrm. The production13
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technology is identical in the two countries.
A source-based corporate tax is applied on the declared proﬁt of the representative
ﬁrm in the two countries. Therefore, the aggregated net proﬁt of the corporate sector is as
follows:
ΠTot
t =( 1− τA
t )ΓA

























t represents the declared proﬁts of the ﬁrm in country i , and therefore its corporate tax
base. We assume that the ﬁrm can deduce capital depreciation from the taxable proﬁts.4
We deﬁne st > 0 (respect. < 0) the total amount of proﬁt shifted form country A to country
B (respect. from B to A). These proﬁt manipulations are costly to the ﬁrm since national
tax authorities seek to prevent tax evasion (for instance, transfer pricing distortions have
to be justiﬁed). The function ψ(st) capturing this cost is convex: ψ(0) = 0, ψs(st) > 0
and ψss(st) > 0.5 Following Kolmar and Wagener (2007), we use the following functional
form: ψ(St)=b(st)2.
By maximizing 6 with respect to ki
t, wi
t and st, we obtain the equations describing the
behaviour of the corporate sector. The allocation of capital in each country depends on











4Modeling this way implies that the statutory tax rate is equivalent to the eﬀective marginal tax rate.
If we allow the ﬁrm to deduce the ﬁnancial cost of capital, the eﬀective marginal tax rate would then be
zero. This alternative is less realistic and it does not change the mechanism of the model. The relation
between public capital and tax rate depends mainly on the statutory tax rate.
5This cost should be interpreted as the probability of being audit by the authorities, not being able to
justify the transfer prices, and consequently being ﬁned. We, therefore, assume that the marginal cost of
tax evasion increases with the total amount of proﬁt shifted.14
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The total amount of capital used in country i is such that its marginal productivity equals
the gross cost of capital (which includes the cost of depreciation). Net cost of capital in a
given country, υi
t, increases with interest rates and corporate tax rate. Besides, because of
the perfect mobility of capital, a unique interest rate applies in the two countries. When
the government increases the total stock of public capital, Pi
t, this automatically increases
ki∗
t due to its positive eﬀect on marginal productivity of capital.
As one unit of labour is inelastically supplied in the two countries, the ﬁrm’s decision






At last, the ﬁrm’s decision on paper proﬁt responds to the tax rate diﬀerential. Because
ψs(st) > 0, proﬁt will be shifted from A to B if τA − τB > 0. Proﬁt-shifting ﬂows are
























The purpose of the government is to maximize the present discounted value of the house-
hold lifetime utility derived from public spending. In our model, the decision maker aims to
increase public spending ultimately and, therefore, behaves like a leviathan. This assump-
tion should be seen as a shortcut. The alternative would be to have two types of distortive15
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taxation and a decision-maker maximising the consumer’s utility. However, as we want
to study the dynamic model, we would need to approach this issue through the optimal
dynamic taxation theory, which we want to avoid, since it would lead us well beyond the
scope of our study.6
Public resources in country i depend on the personal and corporate income tax revenue.
Corporate tax revenue Ri
t depends on a statutory tax rate and the corporate tax base (i.e.
the declared proﬁt of the ﬁrm in country i).
gi
t + pi






















The second constraint the government faces is the law of motion equation of public capital
stock (δp is the rate of depreciation) :
Pi
t =( 1− δp)Pi
t−1 + pi
t (12)
We consider that the governments anticipate the outcome of their choice on the decisions
of the private sector. In this sense governments know that both their decision on tax rate
and public capital aﬀect the ﬁrm’s choice of capital (7), labour (8) and proﬁt shifting (9)
and, therefore, the corporate revenue. Public decision consists of the choice of a statutory
tax rate, τi
t and a decision on public resources allocation between public investment and
government consumption. Each government decides simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
6An alternative way to interpret the government’s problem is to think the government maximizes con-
sumer’s lifetime utility, but is limited on the amount of taxes it can collect (¯ t). If the consumers have
strong preferences for the public goods, the supply of public goods is always below optimum. The level of
consumption is very high and its marginal beneﬁt too low compared to both public goods. In this case the
government’s problem collapses to (10).16
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Not surprisingly, the government chooses τi










Since a corporate tax rate policy is decided simultaneously and non-cooperatively by the
two countries, tax equilibrium between A and B is, thus, the outcome of a Nash game.



























A corporate tax policy stance has two major determinants. Firstly, each government
attempts to maximize the revenue of its “productive” tax base, denoted ¯ Γ(.). This consists






























As one can observe on Figure 2, the revenue derived from this fraction of the tax base
follows the pattern of a traditional Laﬀer curve with respect to the corporate tax rate and
is maximized for τmax
i .W h e n τi
t >τ i
max, any corporate tax hike would entail a net loss,
because the marginal revenue would be oﬀset by the shrinking of the tax base.
The second determinant of a corporate tax policy is easily observed on (15): tax rate in
a given country is clearly responding to its partner’s tax rate. These strategic interactions17
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describe a race to the bottom phenomenon which is entirely dependent on proﬁt mobility.
When b is low, the multinational ﬁrm can engage proﬁt shifting operations forcing the two
countries to compete more (see Figure 3). On the other hand, if proﬁt shifting operations
were no longer aﬀordable (b → +∞), strategic interactions would disappear and corporate
tax rates would be set at τi
max.
Having described in details the nature of tax competition in this model, we can now


























When maximizing (13) with respect to pi
t we obtain: λt = ξ/gi
t, so that the Lagrange
multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal cost of public investment in t (in terms
of households foregone utility of consumption of the public good). The right hand side
represents the discounted beneﬁts of investing on public capital. It is composed of the
direct beneﬁt of public capital on the representative household utility (γ/Pi
t+1). The second18
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component of the beneﬁt refers to the anticipated eﬀect of public capital stock on the tax
revenue: investing more on public capital, will drive the multinational ﬁrm to install more
capital, thus bringing extra revenues in the future. This revenue may then be used to
supply a general public good to the population. The third component reﬂects the fact that
public capital is a durable good so these two eﬀects carry on to the following periods after
depreciation is accounted for.






Pi = r + δp (18)
The interpretation of (18) is very simple. The marginal beneﬁt of an increase of public
capital stock depends on its positive eﬀect on corporate tax revenue and the marginal
utility that the representative household derives from this public policy (which is of course
decreasing with Pi). The gross marginal cost increases with the interest rate and the
depreciation rate of public capital stock.
We can observe by the ﬁrst order conditions (14) and (17) that the two instruments
used by the decision maker in order to collect corporate tax revenue are interdependent.
We illustrate this partial equilibrium relationship for country A on the Figure 4 below.
Except for extreme values of τA
t , the stock of public capital is increasing with the statutory
tax rate. This pattern directly depends on how strong is the impact of public capital on
total corporate tax revenue (∂Ri(Pi,τi,τj)/∂Pi), which obviously declines when tax rate
takes lower values. Note that total capital stock remains positive even when tax rate is
equal to zero (indeed, as we can clearly see on (18), public capital stock does provide a
satisfaction to the representative household besides increasing future tax revenue, so, it
does not disappear even in the absence of corporate taxation).19
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Figure 4: Government’s ﬁrst order conditions
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On the other hand, tax rate depends positively on the level of public capital. The
higher the public capital, the higher the rents, so the higher the governments will set their
tax rate. Nevertheless, tax rate appears to be less reactive to public capital stock. In our
model the tax policy stance relies mostly on the level of tax competition and on the partner
country’s tax rate.
The endogenous relation between public capital and corporate tax rate, which we de-
scribe above, is not model speciﬁc. Under the ”leviathan” assumption, the government
uses corporate tax rate to maximize tax receipts and public investment partially to maxi-
mize future tax revenue. If we assumed a perfectly benevolent government using two types
of distortionary taxes to raise revenue, a very similar intuition would hold. Firstly, the
government would use a combination of taxes to minimize the distortions needed to raise
a certain amount of revenue. Public capital would, nevertheless, still create rents and it
would guarantee that part of the future revenue would be non-distortionary. Thus, the
higher the corporate tax rate, the higher the level of non-distortionary revenue generated
by a certain level of rents, so the higher the optimal level of public capital stock.20
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2.4 Market Clearing
In order to close the model we need three additional conditions. First we have the market





















Total capital used by the ﬁrm equals to the amount of capital held by the households. Total
production in the two countries must equal to the total private and public consumption,
private and public investment and the cost of proﬁt shifting. Finally, we need a ﬁnal










In this section we analyze the quantitative implications of corporate tax competition for
public capital and public investment. The model is calibrated for an annual frequency.
Table 1 shows the values of the parameters and the implied steady state values for key
variables.
The calibration of the ﬁrst four parameters is quite standard. The discount factor is
such that the annual real interest rate is 3.5%. In line with Kamps (2006), the annual rate
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Table 1: Calibration and steady state values in the benchmark case
Calibration Steady State
















0.08 k/y Private capital stock / output 2.00





0.182 τ Corporate tax rate 0.3
b Cost of proﬁt shifting 0.625 R/y Corporate tax revenue / output 0.054
of depreciation of public capital is 5%. Its private counterpart is set at 8%. The elasticity
of output with respect to private capital is 0.26. The parameter θ is more controversial.
Estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital range from 0 to 0.80.
We set the value to 0.08 following a meta-analysis study of Bom and Ligthart (2008).
The last three coeﬃcients are calibrated in order to obtain realistic steady state values
for some variables. The relative preference for the two types of public goods, γ/ξ,i ss u c h
that public capital stock as a share of output in equilibrium is 0.55. The lump sump tax ¯ t
is such that the government consumption in the economy is close to 22 percent of output.
As we do not have any estimates of the cost parameter of proﬁt shifting, b is set such that
the corporate tax rate equilibrium is 30 percent. These three values are in line the evidence
on OECD countries shown in the introduction.22
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3.2 Steady State Eﬀect of Competition
Starting from this baseline calibration, we now illustrate the consequences of tax compe-
tition on public capital stock and other key variables in the economy. Figure 5 illustrates
how the tax rate equilibrium depends on the cost of proﬁt shifting. We observe that when
proﬁt shifting becomes more aﬀordable, a race to the bottom occurs. Not surprisingly in
the extreme case of perfect proﬁt mobility, tax rate is driven to zero.











0 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.6 0.75 0.9 1.05 1.2 1.35 1.5 1.65 1.8
b
tax rate
The Figure 6 below shows how the steady state stocks of public capital and public
investment over output respond to changes in the tax rate (driven by the decline in b).
Under the benchmark scenario, a change of the statutory tax rate from 45% to 30% percent
leads to a decline of public capital stock of 11% of output and a decline of public investment
of 0.4% of output.
The overall eﬀect of increasing competition can be decomposed in two: the revenue
and substitution eﬀects. On the one hand, a decline in the tax rate automatically reduces
total tax receipts, thus reducing the level of public investment, as well as government
consumption via the budget identity. On the other hand, reduction of the tax rate makes
public investment less attractive in relation to government consumption, as discussed in23
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Figure 6: Corporate tax rate and the allocation of public spending
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the previous section. The overall decline might be, however, over-estimated because of the
inﬂuence of the revenue eﬀect. In reality, this eﬀect is indeed likely to play a minor role
since the total tax revenue derived from corporate taxation has remained relatively stable
despite the fall of the statutory tax rate. In order to isolate the substitution eﬀect in our
analysis, we artiﬁcially control for the revenue eﬀect by changing ¯ t such that total revenue
is kept constant (see the dash lines in Figure 6). The decline of public capital and public
investment would be slightly less than a half, 4% and 0.2% of output respectively.
Figure 7 illustrates the revenue and substitution eﬀects. As tax rate decreases, corpo-
rate tax revenue goes down (left-hand side). In the case of extreme competition, corporate
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taxation disappears. The substitution eﬀect is visible in the ratio between public invest-
ment and the general public good. As tax rates are driven to lower levels, we indeed observe
a shift in the composition of public spending in favour of government consumption.
Figure 8 depicts the steady state response of some macroeconomic variables to changes
in competition. The stock of private capital as well as private consumption go up with
the increase in the tax competition. One might also expect that the race to the bottom
of corporate tax rate always has a positive eﬀect on total output. However, when tax
rates reach very low levels, tax competition turns out to be counter-productive to the
total output. The hump-shape curve displayed on the left-hand side is explained by the
fact that public capital stock increases the marginal productivity of private capital. This
productivity deteriorates when tax competition reduces the stock of public capital. When
tax competition is strong, this negative eﬀect cannot be compensated by the increase in
private capital. One can, therefore, observe that there exists a threshold tax rate under
which corporate tax competition is harmful to production.8
8Note that this threshold value is highly dependent on the value of the parameter θ. We do not explore
this issue further as our model is not indicated for welfare analysis.25
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3.3 Dynamic eﬀects of competition
Our model allows us to study the transition dynamics. We analyse how the main variables
of the model respond to an increase in corporate tax rate competition from b =0 .705
(which implies a tax rate of 35%) to b =0 .625 (baseline scenario with 30% tax rate). We
run two exercises, an unanticipated shock (Figure 9) and a shock anticipated 5 periods
ahead (Figure 10).
Figure 9: Response to an unanticipated permanent shock in b
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One can see from the Figure 9 that tax rate declines immediately close to its new steady
state value once the shock occurs. Furthermore, public investment also drops sharply in
response, then picks up and converges to the new steady state. Simulations show that the
short run eﬀect is roughly three times higher than the long run eﬀect. In this particular
case, a decline of the tax rate by 5% has an immediate impact on public investment of
0.41% while the long run eﬀect is only 0.14%. This outcome occurs because the government
readjusts his optimal stock public capital in response to the decline of the tax rate. Not
surprisingly, a greater degree of tax competition has a positive eﬀect on the stock of private
capital and on output.
Figure 10 displays the surprising outcome of an anticipated shock. One would, indeed,
expect the government to start adjusting its stock of capital downward when anticipating
the shock on b. In fact, one can observe an opposite mechanism: the government accumu-
lates capital in the periods before the shock, and only reduces investment once the shock
takes place. The logic behind this can be understood as follows. Public capital is a way
governments have to save. It works like private capital in the traditional RBC model. If
the decision-maker expects a lower revenue in the future, it will start saving more now, in
order to smooth, in this case, government consumption. But at the point the shock in b
takes place, both the revenue and substitution eﬀect take place and we observe a sharp fall
of public investment and the subsequent decline in public capital. Also, the tax rate only
declines to values close to the new steady state once the shock occurs.
3.4 Robustness analysis
3.4.1 Alternative calibration
Having described the main eﬀects of corporate tax competition on our benchmark model,
we now consider diﬀerent realistic scenarios. For all of them, we analyze the evolution of the27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 928
August 2008
Figure 10: Response to an anticipated permanent shock in b
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public capital stock, public investment and government consumption. We observe that the
main conclusion of the ﬁrst section is conﬁrmed: corporate tax competition has a negative
impact on the stock of public capital. The quantitative prediction is also quite robust.
Public capital stock over GDP falls between 8% and 15% of output and public investment
between 0.3% and 0.6% of output under the alternative scenarios. The substitution eﬀect
accounts for close to half of the total eﬀect.
Since the value of the parameter θ has involved a lot of controversies, we test alternative28
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Table 2: Eﬀects of competition under alternative parameterizations
Public capital stock Public Investment
Parameters τ = 45% τ = 30% TE SE τ = 45% τ = 30% TE SE
1. θ =0 .12 77.2% 62.6% 14.6% 5.2% 3.1% 2.5% 0.6% 0.3%
2. θ =0 .04 56.5% 48.4% 8.1% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9% 0.3% 0.1%
3. α =0 .30 65.0% 52.5% 12.4% 4.4% 2.6% 2.1% 0.5% 0.2%
4. α =0 .2 67.2% 57.4% 9.8% 3.4% 2.7% 2.3% 0.4% 0.2%
5. γ/ξ =0 .22 76.1% 63.7% 12.4% 4.0% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0.2%
6. γ/ξ =0 .14 55.7% 46.0% 9.7% 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 0.4% 0.2%
7. ¯ t =0 .30 75.1% 63.7% 11.4% 4.3% 3.0% 2.5% 0.5% 0.2%
8. ¯ t =0 .18 57.1% 46.2% 10.8% 3.4% 2.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0.2%
values for the contribution of public capital stock on private output (scenarios 1 and 2). For
this reason, and despite the fact that our calibration is in line with the recent estimations
given in the literature, we simulate two extreme cases. When Pi has a minor eﬀect on
the output, the stock of public capital is lower at the steady state and exhibits a lower
variability in the tax rates. By contrast, when θ is relatively high, we observe that tax
competition entails a larger drop of public capital stock.
Allowing diﬀerent values for α (scenarios 3 and 4) aﬀects the substitutability between
the private and the public capital. Not surprisingly, when the production process relies
more on private capital, we observe a greater decline of public capital stock. Scenarios
5 and 6 describe the eﬀect of a change of the relative preferences of the society for the
two public policy dimensions. Without a doubt, the relative preferences for public capital
γ/ξ has a relatively high impact on the level of public capital stock but less on its pattern.
Diﬀerent preferences do not aﬀect the main mechanism of our model. Analyzing the impact
of the variation of the exogenous tax rate leads to the same conclusions. The total stock
of public capital increases with ¯ t, whose real value is a major determinant of the scope
of government. The relationship between the corporate tax rate and the stock of public29
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Figure 11: Robustness analysis - substitution eﬀect
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capital is robust to changes in the value of the parameters.30
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3.4.2 Asymmetric countries
Our ﬁnal exercise is to analyse the steady state values when asymmetries between the
two countries are introduced. We consider two cases: asymmetries in θ and in α.T h e
respective results are shown in Figures 12 and 13.
When the production of a country relies more on public capital (country A in this sim-
ulation), the government accumulates more public capital than country B. This generates
Figure 12: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to public capital)
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Figure 13: Asymmetric countries (elasticity of output with respect to private capital)
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higher rents for the ﬁrm in country A, so the government sets a higher tax rate. In this
case, there is proﬁt shifting from country A to county B. If the level of competition is low,
then the country with high θ has a higher output than its partner, but as competition
increases and tax rate declines, the negative eﬀect in public capital is very strong and total
output also declines. This suggests that for countries that depend more on public capital,
corporate tax competition might induce signiﬁcant welfare costs.
We now turn to the analysis of the case with diﬀerent α’s. Country A, where α is32
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higher, has a higher capital stock and higher output than its partner. The government
sets a higher tax rate for this country, so there is proﬁt shifting to country B. It is also
interesting to notice that the decline in public capital is much stronger for country A. In
the absence of tax competition, it has a higher public capital stock, but when competition




To access the validity of the main mechanism of our model, we estimate policy functions
for the statutory corporate tax rate (taxit) and for public investment (invit) in the spirit
of Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008):
taxit = α1invit + α2taxrw
it + α3Xit + εi +  it (21)
invit = β1taxit + β2invrw
it + β3Xit + υi + μit
We use statutory tax rate and not eﬀective marginal tax rate. It is clear from the model that
public investment depends on the statutory tax rate (the true rate of return of generating
one extra unit of rents) and not on the eﬀective marginal tax rate.9
Apart from the endogeneity between the two tools, we also consider the international
competition element. The statutory tax rate also responds to the tax rate of the rest of the
world (taxrw
it ).10 Public investment depends on the statutory tax rate, but we also allow it
9It should be noted that the dependence of public investment on the statutory tax rate exists regardless
of the level of the eﬀective marginal tax rate. Also, this relation persists in a closed economy or in the
absence of international competition.
10It is not our purpose to ﬁnd out if the response to the foreign tax rate is due to competition for proﬁts33
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to respond to the level of public investment of foreign countries (invrw
it ). Although we do
not model this element explicitly with our model, we include it to make the setting more
realistic. Moreover, it allows us to identify the eﬀect of public investment on the tax rate.
In the absence of this element, it is hard to ﬁnd another possible instrument for public
investment. Xit is a vector of control variables. We estimate each equation separately
using instrumental variables estimation. The system is exactly identiﬁed: each equation
has one omitted variable that is used as an instrument for the endogenous variable in the
other equation. For the instruments to be valid, it is crucial that the corporate tax rate
does not respond to foreign public investment and public investment does not react to the
foreign tax rate. Although we cannot a priori justify this assumption based on existing
evidence, we can test the validity of the instruments after the estimation.
The estimation of these reaction functions, suﬀers from more problems of endogene-
ity. The tax rate and public investment of the rest of the world might react to domestic
developments in the respective variables. Furthermore, some of the controls might also
be endogenous to the tax rate or to public investment. To minimize these problems, we
compute a 3 year non overlapping averages. Each time observation corresponds to 3 years
averages. We, then, estimate these equations with all controls that might be endogenous,
as well as the foreign variables entering in lags. Although we cut the sample size to one
third, it still allows us to be much more conﬁdent that our estimator will be consistent.
The corporate tax and public investment of the rest of the world are weighted averages
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In the reaction functions we include public investment instead of public capital. Firstly
because the decision variable of governments is public investment. Secondly, this way we
avoid problems of non-stationarity, because both tax rate and public investment are bound
between 0 and 1 and, therefore, cannot have unit roots. Similarly to Devereux, Lockwood,
and Redoano (2008) we do not include lagged dependent variables.11
4.2 Data
We estimate the policy functions using a panel of 21 OECD countries. The variable cor-
porate tax rate was taken from Michigan World Tax Database, and public investment was
taken from Kamps (2006) and expanded with OECD data until 2005. In the data appendix,
we report some country by country charts with the main variables.
For robustness purposes, we use three diﬀerent weights to calculate the variables for
t h er e s to ft h ew o r l d :u n i f o r mw e i g h t s( W1), the openness of the economy (W2)a n dt h e
population (W3). The correlations between the three measures within a country range
from 0.80 to 0.95 for both variables.
We use the following control variables: government consumption, the ﬁscal surplus, the
degree of openness, GDP growth, the level of private capital, population growth, a dummy
for election year, the % of left wing votes and a dummy if the country joined the EMU2
11In this way we can still have consistent estimates of the short run coeﬃcients without introducing
technical complications of estimating equations with lagged dependent variables in panel data. For instance,
we would have to estimate the equations in diﬀerences (Arellano and Bond), which would be problematic
because there would be many zeros on the left hand side. If we ignored the bias generated by the lagged
dependent variable and estimated the system in levels, we would have multicollinearity problems between
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after 1999. Summary statistics and the source of each variable can be found in Table A1
in the data appendix.
4.3 Estimation
We estimate the policy functions using IV estimation. Given that we only have 21 countries,
we model the country’s speciﬁc error as ﬁxed eﬀect. In the estimations, we also include
country speciﬁc time trends.
We consider government consumption, the ﬁscal surplus, the degree of openness, GDP
growth, the level of private capital as potentially endogenous, so they enter the equation
in lags (previous non-overlapping 3 year’s average).
We estimate an unrestricted and a restricted model. The unrestricted model includes
all controls. We, then, remove the non-signiﬁcant variables and add them as additional
controls. We test the under-identiﬁcation of each equation and, in the case of the restricted
models, we perform the Sargan over-identiﬁcation test.
Table 3 and 4 shows the results. All speciﬁcations have considerable good ﬁt with an
R2 above 0.65. Except for the unrestricted speciﬁcation for the corporate tax rate using
W2, all regressions pass the underindentiﬁcation test, suggesting that in general, the rest
of the world variables are valid instruments for the the corresponding domestic variables.
Also, in all restricted speciﬁcations we conclude from the Sargan test that we do no reject
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
There are two important results. Firstly, there is evidence of the endogeneity between
the the two variables, particularly from the corporate tax rate to the public investment.36
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Table 3: Estimation results: corporate tax rate
 W1  W2  W3 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
2.999 2.478  15.224  2.055  4.532***  3.524*** 
t Inv
(0.78) (1.35) (0.54) (1.02) (2.63) (2.71) 
0.385*** 0.410***  0.342  0.454*** 0.427*** 0.461*** 
1
rw
t Tax − (3.14) (3.74) (1.05) (4.18) (3.45) (4.29) 
0.892* 0.858***  2.165  0.699** 0.951***  0.815*** 
1 t Govcons − (1.92)  (3.2)  (0.68) (2.34) (2.89) (3.07) 
0.038  0.637  0.136  
1 t Budget − (0.17)  (0.47)  (0.85)  
0.007  0.212  0.068  
1 t GDPg − (0.03)  (0.34)  (0.28)  
0.137** 0.128**  0.18  0.116*  0.115  0.105 
1 t Open − (2.05) (2.12) (0.94) (1.92) (1.59) (1.64) 
0.628   12.967   2.379  
1 t K − (0.13)  (0.46)  (0.64)  
-4.266*** -4.079***  -7.945  -3.718*** -4.514*** -4.002*** 
t Popg
(-2.83) (-4.11) (-0.87) (-3.65) (-3.82) (-4.02) 
-0.255  -0.709  -0.464  
t Election (-0.17)  (-0.22)  (-0.29)  
0.071  0.225  0.086  
t Left
(0.82)  (0.59)  (1.05)  
-0.735   1.391  -0.36  
t Emu
(-0.38)  (0.25)  (-0.19)  
Country  trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  245 245 245 245 245 245 
Countries  21 21 21 21 21 21 
R

















& -  1.160 
[0.979]  -  2.015 
[0.918]  -  1.803 
[0.937] 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation of the 
previous 3 years. The estimation runs from 1966-1969 to 1999-2002. It includes the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States. The equations are estimated using Instrumental Variables fixed effects estimation. In columns (1) the 
equation is exactly identify with 
rw
t inv
 as instrument for  t inv
. In columns (2) the non-significant variables 
are excluded from the equation but added as additional instruments. The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
# The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test statistic is to be compared to a 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments. The p-value is in brackets.  
& The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Under the 
null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is 
in brackets.  37
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Table 4: Estimation results: public investment
  W1 W2 W3 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
0.062** 0.039*  0.066  0.069* 0.077* 0.075** 
t Tax
(1.98) (1.73) (1.57)  (1.9)  (1.92) (2.00) 
0.315*  0.356**  0.233 0.231 0.126 0.125 
1
rw
t Inv − (1.71) (2.13) (1.38) (1.48) (0.44) (0.44) 
-0.164*** -0.142*** -0.173*** -0.172*** -0.166*** -0.161*** 
1 t Govcons − (-4.11) (-4.11) (-3.91) (-4.06) (-3.81) (-3.82) 
-0.043**  -0.046*** -0.043** -0.044** -0.042** -0.042** 
1 t Budget − (-2.47) (-2.84) (-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-2.28) 
-0.009   -0.01   -0.016  
1 t GDPg − (-0.29)  (-0.31)  (-0.51)  
-0.014    -0.017 -0.018* -0.017 -0.018* 
1 t Open − (-1.27)  (-1.38)  (-1.7)  (-1.57)  (-1.75) 
-0.711 -0.571 -0.757*  -0.712*  -0.944**  -0.865** 
1 t K − (-1.63) (-1.53) (-1.67) (-1.72) (-2.14) (-2.11) 
0.552*** 0.467*** 0.581*** 0.578*** 0.590*** 0.567*** 
t Popg
(3.16) (3.10) (2.90) (3.11) (2.96) (2.96) 
0.015  0.012  0.038  
t Election
(0.08)  (0.06)  (0.18) 
-0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 
t Left
(-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-1.53) (-1.47) 
-0.068   -0.05  0.019  
t Emu
(-0.27)  (-0.18)  (0.07)  
Country  trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  245 245 245 245 245 245 
Countries  21 21 21 21 21 21 
R

















& -  2.865 
[0.581]  -  0.151 
[0.985]  -  0.304 
[0.959] 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 3 year average. The subscript t-1 denotes the observation of the 
previous 3 years. The estimation runs from 1966-1969 to 1999-2002. It includes the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States. The equations are estimated using Instrumental Variables fixed effects estimation n columns (1) the 
equation is exactly identify with 
rw
t tax
 as instrument for  t tax
In columns (2) the non-significant variables are 
excluded from the equation but added as additional instruments. The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** -
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
# The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  The null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. The test statistic is to be compared to a 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments. The p-value is in brackets.  
& The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Under the 
null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is 
in brackets.  38
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Corporate tax rate also responds positively to public investment but it is only statistically
signiﬁcant when we use W3 as weights. This result is consistent with our model, as the
reaction function of tax rate was positive, but very ﬂat in the stock of public capital. On
the other hand, the result that public investment increases with the statutory tax rate is
quite robust to diﬀerent weighting procedures. The coeﬃcient ranges from 0.04 to 0.07.
For an exogenously driven reduction of 15% of the tax rate, public investment goes down
between 0.6% to 1.1%.
The second result is that there is evidence for international competition particularly in
the corporate tax rate. A country’s tax rate responds close to 0.4% to an increase of 1%
i nt h et a xr a t eo ft h er e s to ft h ew o r l d .T h i si si nl i n ew i t hv a l u e sr e p o r t e db yD e v e r e u x ,
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008). For public investment, the coeﬃcient of response to the
foreign public investment is lower - between 0.2 and 0.3, but is only signiﬁcant if we use
uniform weights.
With respect to the control variables, government consumption, openness and popula-
tion growth are, in general, signiﬁcant in both equations. Private capital and ﬁscal surplus
are only signiﬁcant for public investment.
5 Concluding Remarks
The strong downward trend of the statutory corporate tax rates represents one of the most
striking aspects of international competition between governments. The main objective of
this paper is to point out that other consequences of corporate tax rate competition have
been overlooked.
Keen and Marchand (1997) argued that tax competition might lead to “too many
business centers and airports but not enough parks or libraries”. In fact, this statement39
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might be inconsistent with the general decline of public capital stock that has taken place
over the last two decades among many OECD countries.
By contrast, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between tax competition and public capital
stock. The key diﬀerence between these two results is the following. In their setting, the
relation between tax rate and public capital comes from international competition. In the
presence of competition, there will be a bias in favour of public investment. In our model,
this relation exists even in the absence of competition. Public capital stock increases tax
revenue. Because of this positive externality there is always a bias in favour of public
capital. As competition drives tax rate down, this reduces the externality of public capital
and governments have an incentive to reduce their supply. The robustness analysis we
performed provides a strong evidence that the central mechanism of our paper remains
valid. Besides, this link appears to be signiﬁcant for most countries where the share of
public capital stock has, indeed, decreased.
The general equilibrium analysis appears to be extremely helpful since it allows us to
assess quantitatively the eﬀects of competition. We show that tax competition leads to a
reduction of both tax rate and public investment. If tax rate goes down by 15%, public
investment in steady state goes down between 0.2% and 0.4% of GDP. The short run impact
is three times stronger. Our empirical estimates point to slightly higher values: between
0.6% and 1.1% of GDP. Further empirical evidence indicates that there is international
competition in both corporate tax rate and public investment.
Although tax competition is likely to have a negative eﬀect on the overall supply of
public goods, the traditional view considers that tax competition favours the private sector.
This is indeed what we found in the baseline scenario and it is explained by the fact that a
race to the bottom reduces the net cost of capital. Nevertheless, we found that it exists a40
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threshold tax rate under which tax competition has a negative eﬀect on total output. This
threshold depends crucially on the elasticity of output with respect to public capital.
We believe that our analysis is particularly relevant for the European Union countries
where enlargement is likely to put more pressure on tax rates and therefore could reinforce
the downward trend of public capital stock in western European countries.
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Appendix 1 - The General Equilibrium Model
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Variable Description Mean Sd Max Min Source
Inv Public investment (% GDP) 3.499 1.504 10.09 0.770 Kamps (2006)
Tax Top bracket corporate tax 38.21 8.730 56.41 7.148 Michigan World Tax Database
Govcons Gov. consumption (% GDP) 17.66 4.511 30.14 7.325 OECD-Main Economic Indicators
Budget Budget surplus (% GDP) -2.212 3.851 18.00 -15.71 IMF- IFS
GDPg GDP growth 2.778 2.639 12.48 -7.283 IMF- IFS
Popg Population growth 0.660 0.569 3.799 -4.526 WB - WDI
Open Openness (% GDP) 54.77 29.29 184.2 7.416 WB - WDI
Capital Private capital (% GDP) 2.512 0.541 3.818 1.255 Kamps (2006)
Left Left party votes (% total) 37.96 14.15 67.6 0 Comparative parties dataset
Election Dummy for election year 0.316 0.465 1 0 Comparative parties dataset
Note: the comparative party dataset was created by Duane Swank and is
available on http://www.mu.edu/polisci/Swank.htm.44
ECB













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year




































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year



































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year


































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year



































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Government Consumption (% GDP)
Canada45
ECB













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year

































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year


































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year






































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year





























































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Government Consumption (% GDP)
Greece46
ECB













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year



































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year





































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year





































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)














1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year

































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Government Consumption (% GDP)
New Zealand47
ECB













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year




































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year

































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year










1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year






































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)




















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Government Consumption (% GDP)
Switzerland48
ECB













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year


































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year









































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Public Investment (% GDP)













1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Government Consumption (% GDP)
United States49
ECB
Working Paper Series No 928
August 2008
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
893  “Sticky wages: evidence from quarterly microeconomic data” by T. Heckel, H. Le Bihan and M. Montornès,
May 2008.
894  “The role of country-specific trade and survey data in forecasting euro area manufacturing production: 
perspective from large panel factor models” by M. Darracq Pariès and L. Maurin, May 2008.
895  “On the empirical evidence of the intertemporal current account model for the euro area countries”
by M. Ca’Zorzi and M. Rubaszek, May 2008.
896  “The Maastricht convergence criteria and optimal monetary policy for the EMU accession countries”
by A. Lipińska, May 2008.
897  “DSGE-modelling when agents are imperfectly informed” by P. De Grauwe, May 2008.
898  “Central bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence” by A. S. Blinder,
M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, J. De Haan and D.-J. Jansen, May 2008.
899  “Robust monetary rules under unstructured and structured model uncertainty” by P. Levine and J. Pearlman, 
May 2008.
900  “Forecasting inflation and tracking monetary policy in the euro area: does national information help?”
by R. Cristadoro, F. Venditti and G. Saporito, May 2008.
901  “The usefulness of infra-annual government cash budgetary data for fiscal forecasting in the euro area”
by L. Onorante, D. J. Pedregal, J. J. Pérez and S. Signorini, May 2008.
902  “Fiscal consolidation in the euro area: long-run benefits and short-run costs” by G. Coenen, M. Mohr and
R. Straub, May 2008.
903  “A robust criterion for determining the number of static factors in approximate factor models” by L. Alessi,
M. Barigozzi and M. Capasso, May 2008.
904  “Does money matter in the IS curve? The case of the UK” by B. E. Jones and L. Stracca, June 2008.
905  “A persistence-weighted measure of core inflation in the euro area” by L. Bilke and L. Stracca, June 2008.
906  “The impact of the euro on equity markets: a country and sector decomposition” by L. Cappiello, A. Kadareja 
and S. Manganelli, June 2008.
907  “Globalisation and the euro area: simulation based analysis using the New Area Wide Model” by P. Jacquinot and 
R. Straub, June 2008.
908  “3-step analysis of public finances sustainability: the case of the European Union” by A. Afonso and C. Rault,
June 2008.
909  “Repo markets, counterparty risk and the 2007/2008 liquidity crisis” by C. Ewerhart and J. Tapking, June 2008.
910  “How has CDO market pricing changed during the turmoil? Evidence from CDS index tranches”by M. Scheicher, 
June 2008.
911  “Global liquidity glut or global savings glut? A structural VAR approach” by T. Bracke and M. Fidora, June 2008.50
ECB
Working Paper Series No 928
August 2008
912  “Labour cost and employment across euro area countries and sectors” by B. Pierluigi and M. Roma, June 2008.
913  “Country and industry equity risk premia in the euro area: an intertemporal approach” by L. Cappiello, 
M. Lo Duca and A. Maddaloni, June 2008.
914  “Evolution and sources of manufacturing productivity growth: evidence from a panel of European countries”
by S. Giannangeli and R. Gόmez-Salvador, June 2008.
915  “Medium run redux: technical change, factor shares and frictions in the euro area” by P. McAdam and
A. Willman, June 2008.
916  “Optimal reserve composition in the presence of sudden stops: the euro and the dollar as safe haven currencies” 
by R. Beck and E. Rahbari, July 2008.
917  “Modelling and forecasting the yield curve under model uncertainty” by P. Donati and F. Donati, July 2008.
918  “Imports and profitability in the euro area manufacturing sector: the role of emerging market economies”
by T. A. Peltonen, M. Skala, A. Santos Rivera and G. Pula, July 2008.
919  “Fiscal policy in real time” by J. Cimadomo, July 2008.
920  “An investigation on the effect of real exchange rate movements on OECD bilateral exports” by A. Berthou,
July 2008.
921  “Foreign direct investment and environmental taxes” by R. A. De Santis and F. Stähler, July 2008.
922  “A review of nonfundamentalness and identification in structural VAR models” by L. Alessi, M. Barigozzi and
M. Capasso, July 2008.
923  “Resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations” by K. Christoffel and K. Kuester, 
August 2008.
924  “Government spending volatility and the size of nations” by D. Furceri and M. Poplawski Ribeiro, August 2008.
925  “Flow on conjunctural information and forecast of euro area economic activity” by K. Drechsel and L. Maurin, 
August 2008.
926  “Euro area money demand and international portfolio allocation: a contribution to assessing risks to price 
stability” by R. A. De Santis, C. A. Favero and B. Roffia, August 2008.
927  “Monetary stabilisation in a currency union of small open economies” by M. Sánchez, August 2008.
928  “Corporate tax competition and the decline of public investment” by P. Gomes and F. Pouget, August 2008.